International policy entrepreneurship and production of international public goods: the case of multilateral trade regime by Trofimov, Ivan D.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
International policy entrepreneurship and
production of international public goods:
the case of multilateral trade regime
Ivan D. Trofimov
Kolej Yayasan Saad (KYS) / KYS Business School
15 August 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80819/
MPRA Paper No. 80819, posted 16 August 2017 15:48 UTC
 1 
 
International policy entrepreneurship and production of international public goods: the 
case of multilateral trade regime. 
 
Ivan D. Trofimov* 
 
Abstract  
The paper considers public goods in the realm of international governance, provides a 
framework explaining their provision, and applies it in the analysis of the trade policymaking 
in the GATT/WTO. International governance regime is seen as a public good; it is 
conceptualized as an equilibrium state, one where the extent of ideational and material 
conflicts, incongruities in policy mechanisms and the lack of institutions are substantially 
minimised. Such state is brought by policy entrepreneurship on the part of multiple actors. 
Three generic entrepreneurial functions (policy leadership, innovation and 
facilitation/coordination) are identified. Successful equilibration is characterized by the 
complementarity of entrepreneurial functions, as well as by the persistence and ingenuity of 
entrepreneurs in selecting and using specific means and instruments of entrepreneurship. 
Policy entrepreneurship is considered crucial in several areas, including problem framing, 
advocacy and coalition building, policy experimentation, and creation of the analytical 
instruments. It is also salient in moderation of conflicting positions, exercise of influence and 
management of the policy process.  
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1. Introduction 
Ever since the seminal study by Kindleberger (1986) there has been recognition among 
international policy scholars that international public goods (IPGs), such as stable 
international monetary order, open and transparent international trade system and durable 
international peace, are produced at a level that is suboptimal from the global perspective and 
the perspective of individual members of international system. This has been considered a 
serious problem in international political and economic relations in the absence of 
international government. 
The economic and public policy literature on public goods (PG) has been voluminous, 
considering a variety of aspects: typology of PGs and degrees of publicness (Demsetz, 1970; 
Olson, 1971; Cornes, Sandler, 1996); political bargaining and contestation related to PG 
provision, revelation of preferences for PG and willingness to pay (Buchanan, 1960; 
Buchanan and Musgrave 1999); private versus government provision of PGs (Tiebout, 1956; 
Musgrave, Musgrave, 1973; Ostrom, 1990; Holcombe, 1997); the distinction between 
optimal spending and adequate provision of PGs (Samuelson, 1954; Conceição, 2003); PGs 
as social constructs and policy outcomes (Wildavsky 1994; Marlmolo, 1999); dimensions of 
publicness (Kaul, 2001); technologies and aggregation methods for PG production 
(Hirshleifer, 1983)  
The literature on IPGs has been growing in the recent years, with a number of issues being 
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examined: definition and classification of IPGs (Kaul et al, 1999; Morrissey et al, 2002; Kaul 
et al, 2003: 96-99); optimal provision levels, models of IPG delivery and production 
technologies (Cornes, Sandler, 1996: 221-237; Sandler, 2003: 131-151); institutional 
structures and choices pertaining to IPG provision (Cornes, Sandler, 1994; Martin, 2000); 
financing aspects (Najman, D‟Orville, 1995; Kaul et al, 2002); mechanisms to foster 
cooperation (Sandler, 1998; Fredriksson, 1999); the role of non-state actors in IPG provision 
(Edwards, 2000; Anheier et al, 2001).   
Interactive features of IPG provision and the role of participatory decision-making were 
mentioned as well (Kaul et al, 2003: 101, 103), specifically political aspects, intertwined 
domestic and multilateral governance structures, timing and sequencing of the decisions and 
negotiations, the underlying institutional reforms, behavioral orientations and aberrations, 
political myopia, organizational slack and the role of catalytic leadership (Cernat, 2014: 32; 
Sankar, 2008: 14). The complex process of IPG provision (and broadly of international 
cooperation) thus requires a unifying and coherent framework that would integrate the above 
elements.  
The main argument of this paper is that the level of IPG provision and the shape of resulting 
IPG is a result of a preceding policymaking process and multiple adjustments on part of  
numerous agents scattered across domestic and international fields. Importantly, the exercise 
of policy entrepreneurship is seen as a centerpiece of the provisioning process and a point of 
integration of the above elements. 1  We use the entrepreneurship concepts, originally 
developed by I. M. Kirzner (1973, 1997) and J .A. Schumpeter (2008 [1939], 1961 [1911], 
1987 [1942]) to analyze economic dynamics and market process. By extending the economic 
entrepreneurship concept to international policy domain, we conceptualize production 2 of 
IPGs as an equilibration process, whereby international policy entrepreneurs exercise three 
types of entrepreneurial functions (leadership, recombination and coordination). The exercise 
of these functions reduces the scale and magnitude of policy conflicts, establishes solid 
institutions, and fosters negotiation process, thereby eliminating disequilibria in the 
international system and bringing IPG into being.  
The paper considers a specific type of IPGs, namely a “global policy outcome”, or 
“governance IPG” (Morrissey et al, 2002: 40-41). This IPG type is distinguished from natural 
global commons and human made commons (explained further in the text). In addition to 
WTO multilateral free trade regime, examples of “governance IPGs” include (or may include 
in the future) international financial stability regime, Global Environmental Facility (GEF), 
international maritime regime, among others. Clearly, every PG or IPG has its own unique 
characteristics and follows its own unique production path, making theoretical frameworks 
issue-specific. Consideration of other IPGs would thus require modification of the framework 
presented in this paper and its elements, although we posit that basic entrepreneurship 
functions and processes will remain the same. 
The purpose of this paper is threefold: 1). To define and characterize “governance IPGs” 
(Morrissey et al, 2002: 40-41) and international trade governance regime as a specific 
“governance IPG”. 2). To propose a theoretical framework for the analysis of the process of 
the “governance IPG” provision, and to take a nuanced view of equilibration process and 
entrepreneurial functions. 3). To illustrate some possible applications of the framework in the 
field of multilateral trade governance.   
Adoption of policy entrepreneurship as a centerpiece of the synthetic framework allows 
reconsidering the IPG provisioning process (and the process of establishing international 
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cooperation and conducting international reforms) from a manifestly dynamic and agency-
based perspective. Methodologically, a framework could serve as a starting point for 
integration and cross-fertilization of multiple streams of literature in social science: 
entrepreneurship theory, economic reform models, constitutional political economy, 
institutionalism, negotiation theory, game theory, as well as certain contributions from public 
policy literature.  
The synthetic frameworks and models have been common in public policy literature (e.g. 
multiple streams model of J. Kingdon, 1995; advocacy coalitions approach by Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993). These approaches, however, were mostly used to analyze domestic 
policies. In economic literature, a cognitive-evolutionary model by T. Slembeck (1997) is 
notable. It does not, however, consider entrepreneurship as a driving force. The existing 
literature on public entrepreneurship provides a non-functional view of the entrepreneur, 
reducing it to a specific case of government decision making (Wawro, 2000) or vote 
maximization by a politician (François, 2003) or to view it broadly as various activities that 
improve the functioning of the public domain and society (Boyett, 1997; Sommerrock, 2010). 
The specific functions that entrepreneurs need to perform and the mechanics of 
entrepreneurial action are not explained in a sufficient detail, nor are the factors that can 
undermine the effectiveness of public entrepreneurship. The work by Shockley and Frank 
(2011) that grounds policy entrepreneurship in Kirzner‟s theory stands as exception (albeit it 
does not consider international policy applications either).   
The balance of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers specific features of 
“governance” IPGs and identifies the problem of “governance IPG” provision. The current 
approaches to international cooperation and their shortcomings are briefly reviewed. 
Following that, in Section 3 the issue of institutional and policy disequilibria is discussed, and 
the equilibration and policy entrepreneurship concepts are presented. The possibility of 
adaptation of these concepts to international public policy and IPG domains is examined, and 
tentative mapping of entrepreneurial functions with particular agents is performed. Section 4 
considers particular entrepreneurial functions at agenda-setting and negotiation stages of IPG 
provision and the factors that constrain or enable entrepreneurship. The concluding remarks 
are presented in Section 5.  
2. Characteristics of “governance IPGs” and production problem 
PGs are defined as such commodity, the consumption of which by one party does not reduce 
the quantity available for consumption by another party, and for which it is impossible or 
expensive to exclude party from consumption, i.e. the two properties of PG are non-rivalry 
and non-excludability (Samuelson, 1954: 387; Stiglitz, 1995). Respectively, the IPGs are 
such PGs whose benefits are available internationally and can be enjoyed by more than one 
country. Semantically, the terms IPG and global public good (GPG) are used interchangeably; 
however the former is preferable, as ultimate benefits may not be attributed to everyone on 
the globe (Morrissey et al, 2002: 34). In the case of international trade policy, for instance, 
the multilateral trade liberalization in WTO would not apply to non-participants to WTO and 
would not concern autarkic economies like North Korea.  
This general definition, however, requires further elaboration, as far as production of IPGs 
(and “governance IPGs” specifically) is concerned. 
Firstly, the characteristic feature of the “governance IPG” is that it results from deliberate 
policy action on part of many agents, domestic or international. It is distinguished from 
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natural global commons (e.g. atmosphere or ozone layer) that exist irrespective of human 
action, or human made commons (e.g. global stock of knowledge or international standards) 
that are produced by humans, but not through policy process (Kaul et al, 1999: 454). 
Secondly, the “governance IPG” is an intermediate PG, i.e. a precursor and enabler of final 
PGs (Aussilloux et al, 2002; Sapovadia, 2003). The benefits from the production of 
“governance IPGs” do not flow directly to the consumers. Instead, the benefits that 
“governance IPG” brings include risk reduction and capacity enhancement, rather than direct 
provision of utility (Morrissey et al, 2002: 37-38). In the case of multilateral trade regime, the 
benefits from IPG would include creation of stable regime that would allow unhindered flow 
of goods and services (i.e. free trade that will bring ultimate benefits to consumers in the form 
of greater diversity, better quality and lower price of goods), and that would reduce the 
likelihood of adversarial trade practices (dumping, export subsidization) damaging 
international economic and political relations.  
Thirdly, World Bank (2001: 133) and Morrissey et al (2002: 38) distinguish core activities 
(production of IPG) and complementary activities to make them avail (financing of IPG). In 
the case of “governance IPG”, the former aspect is central. While for human-made commons, 
the financing and provision is frequently done by an international agency with a globa l remit 
(e.g. provision of Ebola vaccine through WHO), in the case of international economic 
regimes such agencies may be absent (IMF and World Bank operate guided by pre-defined 
mandate, while WTO is akin to negotiation forum). The provision of “governance IPG” is 
thus a construction process (“governance IPGs” being “public by design”), with political and 
policymaking aspects coming to the forefront (Kaul et al, 1999: 90-91). The impediments to 
“governance IPG” provision would be not of financing nature, but rather of international 
negotiation and domestic bargaining (domestic political constraints prevent or delay 
concessions at international negotiation table, as demonstrated by Putnam, 1988). Importantly, 
as opposed to conventional thinking in PGs literature (for a survey see Oakland, 1987), the 
state, bureaucracy and formal procedures are likely to play important, but not exclusive role 
in the provisioning process (Kaul et al, 1999, ibid). The analysis of PG production will thus 
need to focus on a broader set of stakeholders and actors. Finally, the provisioning process is 
unlikely to be deterministic and linear: most designed PGs follow “complex, 
multidimensional, multilayered, multifactored production path” (Kaul et al, 1999: 101). 
Fourthly, “governance” IPG is typically not a pure PG, as is the case of many PGs even at a 
national level (Sandler, 1997; Mendez, 1992). Excludability can be ensured in certain ways: 
only those countries that are members of the governance forum can enjoy the benefits 
stemming from a constructed regime or policy. The rivalry may also be present: in many 
instances “governance IPGs” are provided at a high level of generality and with varying 
degrees of obligation, i.e. “governance IPG” by its nature does not regulate or prescribe each 
and every aspect of international transaction or activity and therefore does not guarantee the 
complete absence of conflicts or failures. In this case, not every party, country or stakeholder 
will be able to enjoy the final benefits (e.g. the existence of UN Security Council did not 
prevent many of the wars; likewise the existence of WTO does not guarantee the absence of 
trade conflicts). Regarding multilateral trade regime, GATT/WTO regime provides the 
benefits to all signatories to the GATT by means of the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause 
(trade advantages given to one state are extended to all other states). Clearly, MFN clause 
applies only to GATT/WTO members, and hence non-excludability condition is satisfied only 
partially (i.e. GATT/WTO regime is a “club” good, albeit a very inclusive club). However, 
since most economies are now GATT/WTO members, for practical purposes it is feasible to 
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consider that non-excludability is ensured. We note, however, that the degree of excludability 
is higher in regional trade governance (e.g. free trade benefits within EU extend only to its 28 
members). As to non-rivalry, the mechanism of trade barriers reduction is based on first-
difference reciprocity (i.e. the GATT signatories reciprocally agree on the size of tariff cuts, 
but not the resulting level of tariffs, meaning that certain countries or stakeholders therein 
may not get an adequate share of benefits from tariff reduction). Also, certain agreements 
made in GATT/WTO (on civil aircraft, government procurement etc) have plurilateral nature, 
i.e. open for joining on a voluntary basis and extending benefits only to signatories or 
outright discriminating certain signatories. Finally, certain protectionist and trade-distorting 
measures have been permitted in certain trade areas, such as trade in agricultural commodities. 
Overall, multilateral trade regime in WTO may be conceived as “governance IPG” with a 
“partial degree of publicness”.      
Fifthly, in contrast to other IPGs for which the act of provision is clearly defined, the fact that 
“governance IPG” was indeed provided and governance regime is functioning (enabling 
consumption of ultimate benefits) is frequently indeterminate. Kaul et al (1999) mention 
potential PGs: i.e. the PGs that despite their non-rivalry and non-excludability characteristics 
may not be de facto public in consumption. GATT/WTO regime is a potential PG, i.e. it is 
public in form (de jure), but not always in substance (de facto). This means that ongoing 
collective action is required on the part of GATT signatories to prevent and proscribe actual 
trade practices that are at variance with GATT principles and to make GATT regime a “real” 
PG. Such practices include deliberate efforts by certain countries to limit the extent of public 
benefits from free trade through geographical and regional discrimination against non-
participants to regional trade blocs, or attempts to delay implementation of GATT agreements 
or to make use of loopholes and “grey areas” in the GATT system and thereby “legalize” 
national protectionist policies, or actions that outright contravene GATT rules and result in 
trade disputes. Indeed, as argued by some observers (Lemieux, 1989), the history of the 
GATT is an ongoing attempt to realize its true potential, by turning it from a mere stop-gap 
mechanism, preventing closure of the markets and rise of protectionism into a working “free 
trade charter”. In fact, many observers and scholars are skeptical about the potential of the 
GATT/WTO: as argued by Cernat (2004), the PGs that GATT Uruguay Round (1986-1994) 
intended to deliver simply never showed up; as put by Sapovadia (2003), the benefits of both 
intermediate and final IPGs in international trade domain may never eventuate.  
Sixthly, the valuation and demand issues are rather distinct from other PG types. 
Theoretically, knowledge of the demand curve for the PG and of willingness to pay (WTP) is 
needed. But as Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 274-288) state, agents are unlikely to reveal 
WTP truthfully and are likely to strategically misrepresent these values. Such actions are all 
too common in international negotiation, implying that the knowledge about demand for and 
supply of “governance IPG” is obtained incrementally during the process of agenda setting 
and negotiation. The benefits of “governance IPGs” are intangible and their quantification is 
not an easy task. While the estimates of potential benefits of trade liberalization or of the 
reduced risks (e.g. if the new financial regulatory regime is obtained) are available, there is 
no guarantee whatsoever that the value of actual benefits will be anywhere equal or similar to 
the estimates. The values of benefits and costs pertaining to “governance IPG” are 
determined through the political process (Barrett, 2002: 48-49). Specifically, the costs of 
“governance IPG” production may be embodied in the time spent by the relevant parties on  
constructing the governance agreement, while the benefits are the propitious attributes of the 
agreement (e.g. the degree to which the agreement promotes free trade and contains 
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liberalization clauses). Clearly, the costs and benefits are not known ex ante, prior to 
negotiation or agenda setting (Barrett, 2002: 74). In many instances, the partial supply of 
“governance IPGs” is not possible: if the time and negotiation costs are excessive, the 
negotiation is not concluded and governance regime is not obtained, and thereby benefits do 
not result.  
Seventhly, “governance IPGs” are not produced, but rather co-produced by several countries. 
Hence some of them take a lead and play a greater role in the production process (in terms of 
time costs or political concessions made on their part). The costs can be reduced if a coalition 
of like-minded economies pushing for new governance regime is formed and operates (as 
was the case of a coalition of agricultural exporters, pushing for free agricultural trade during 
the GATT Uruguay Round). Thus the aggregate supply of a “governance IPG” (Sandler, 1998; 
Thoyer, 2002; Hirshleifer, 1983) is not purely additive (proportionate contribution of 
individual economies to supply). Instead, it follows a „best shot‟ mode of supply (where the 
overall supply of IPG hinges on the largest individual contributor). We note, however, that 
while governance regime is brought in by certain largest contributors, the ultimate agreement 
or design is not obtained until the interest of the resisting party (or weakest contributor) is 
satisfied. Thus, the „weakest link‟ mode of supply (when the overall supply depends on the 
contribution of the weakest contributor‟s effort) may also be plausible. 
Eighthly, IPGs are generally including substantial stock component, i.e.  “their impact 
depends upon a stock of a capital-like variable that accumulates over time” (Nordhaus, 2006: 
92). Nordhaus in the case of “governance IPGs” mentions institutional stocks and 
institutional inertia. This implies that provision of “governance IPG” and its benefits are to a 
certain extent the function of existing institutions and rules. In the case of the international 
trade regime, the shape of liberal regime is determined not solely or mostly at the negotiation 
table, but domestically through institutional change and demise of protectionist policies. 
Nordhaus talks about depreciation rates, which may be high or low. In the case of trade 
governance, the depreciation rate for protectionism (“global public bad”) has been rather low 
in many areas (e.g. in the agricultural trade that was exempted from free trade principles for a 
substantial period of time).       
Ninthly, Kaul et al (1999: 371-7) mention that supply of IPG is not a one-time event, but 
rather an iterative construction that is subject to reversals and impasses and that involves the  
gradual building of the relevant PG from various policy inputs and building blocks.  
A dynamic framework rooted in entrepreneurship would therefore complement (and to 
certain extend contrast) the previous theoretical approaches to international cooperation: that 
focus on external perturbations or crises triggering policy reform or policy formation 
(Gourevitch, 1986; Rodrik, 1992); that emphasize the role of domestic political factors in 
international policymaking (domestic coalitions and alignments, Frieden, 1991, Hiscox, 2002; 
rent-seeking and endogenous policy formation, Frey, 1984, Magee et al, 1989, Jones, Krueger, 
1990; national government autonomy, Katzenstein, 1978, Krasner, 2009); that look at 
domestic and international constitutions to overcome impediments to IPG provision 
(incorporation of free trade agreement provisions into domestic law, Tumlir, 1982; unilateral 
free trade and flat tariff constitutional clauses, Rowley et al, 1995, Parisi, 1998; free trade 
legal enforcement, Roessler, 1985); that consider institutional constraints on international 
policies (structure of power of legislatures and protectionism, McCormick, Tollison, 1981; 
the power of executive branch, Destler, 1986); game-theoretical approaches that consider 
formation of mechanisms to foster cooperation (repeated interaction in prisoners‟ dilemma, 
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Runge, 1984; reciprocity, Axelrod, 1984; the number of participants, nature of issue, potential 
games from cooperation and the likelihood of cooperation, Olson, 1971, Barrett, 1999).  
Methodologically, we contend that the complete explanation of IPG provision and 
international cooperation would require consideration of factors that enable change rather 
than constrain it (Sen, 1969) and of the processes through which domestic political and 
ideational conflicts are moderated and stable policy “core” is formed; the analysis of 
interplay between domestic and international arena and of the multi-speed change in policy 
settings and instruments and underlying institutions; the analysis of multiple forms of 
leadership and policy innovation in addition to factors that constrain them and reduce their 
effectiveness; view of international cooperation and IPG provision as organic process that is 
not reduced to a set of mechanisms and that follows multiple logics (political feasibility and  
appropriateness in addition to economic optimality). Respectively, some of the previous 
contributions to the literature will be useful and instrumental: specifically, two-level game 
models emphasizing domestic constraints for international negotiations (Putnam, 1988), 
international policy explanations that stress the importance of ideas and culture (Rohrlich, 
1987; Goldstein, 1988), constitutional-contractarian views of policy, in particular those that 
consider continuity and interactive nature of constitutional bargaining  (Buchanan, 2004; 
Herrmann-Pillath, 2006), as well as certain negotiation theories (models of negotiation as a 
management process, Winham, 1977). 
3. Public entrepreneurship and IPG provision 
International policy disequilibria 
The starting point for IPG provision analysis is recognition of disequilibria that exist in 
international policy system. We distinguish four possible disequilibria. 
D1. Policy vacuum exists and the economic processes are not regulated internationally, 
directly affecting respective actors. The absence of governance regime for international 
speculative capital flows is an example of such disequilibria. 
D2. Policies and governance structures exist, but do not operate as intended originally and/or 
do not satisfy the aspirations and needs of policy recipients. Policy problems and 
inconsistencies accumulate and should require reforms and change in the future. Examples of 
such disequilibrium include unsatisfactory functioning of UN Security Council mechanism or 
failing regime for international protection of intellectual property rights.  
D3. The policy is negotiated, but the conflict between policy actors is in full swing – their 
strategies and actions are not matching, their behavioural attitudes towards each other and 
towards current and potential policies do not allow any settlement, their proposals and 
solutions to the policy problem do not fit. This is the reality of all negotiations - the 
disequilibria are eliminated with new policies obtained that suit everyone or with “stop-gap” 
policies that will require re-negotiation later on; alternatively, if negotiations fail, the 
disequilibrium persists.  
D4. The institutional disequilibrium appears when the divergence and intense contestation of 
ideas either preclude formation of any institution, or make the existing institutions untenable, 
with new ideas coming to the forefront and starting to look attractive or old ideas becomin g 
inadequate for regulation. Formulation of policy instruments becomes impossible without 
underlying solid institution. Examples of institutional equilibrium include current 
controversies on global climate change, pervaded by ideological and interpretative rifts; or 
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Washington and Beijing Consensus controversies on international development. In contrast to 
rational choice institutionalism (that views institutions as rules of the game and laws that 
constrain behavior, North, 1990), we adopt a definition of institutions as a sociological or 
cultural phenomenon (DiMaggio, Powell, 1991: 8; Scott, 2001). Institutions are 
conceptualized as a set of views held by policy actors of what the social reality around them 
looks like and associated beliefs/contentions of what the policy ought to be to conform to 
these views (Myrdal, 1944; Bromley, 2006: 27). Given that almost every policy and social 
issue involves alternative interpretations, beliefs and views, institutional construction is a 
process of contestation of ideas and views.  
All four disequilibria mentioned above may amplify one another or be superimposed, for 
example, policy negotiation problems during initial policy creation (D1 and D3), or a lack of 
commonly held views regarding policy reform and modification (D2 and D4). The case of 
agricultural trade talks during Dillon and Kennedy Rounds in the GATT illustrates the point. 
Apart from usual negotiation deadlocks (D3), D1 and D4 disequilibria were present: one of 
the parties (EC) was in the process of constructing its agricultural policies and institutions. At 
the same time the farm policies in the other party (USA) were experiencing problems: 
burdened by unplanned effects, they required adjustments and reforms, with externalisation 
of domestic problems being one of the options (S2). Unsurprisingly, no agricultural trade 
policy settlement was reached in these rounds.   
International policy equilibrium 
In contrast, in international policy equilibrium, the contradictions and conflicts are (partially) 
resolved. A new institutional arrangement integrating previously conflicting visions is 
obtained; the strategies and proposals are fitted together to the mutual satisfaction of parties; 
the influence of behavioural constraints, precluding agreement, is minimized; and the policy 
inconsistencies are eliminated and substituted with more solid policy constructs.  The 
attainment of such equilibrium would signify that “governance IPG” has been produced. 
“Governance IPG” is thus conceptualized as such governance arrangement that brings  
stability and equilibrium to the international policy system, thereby allowing consumption of 
final IPGs (free trade, stable international finance, durable international peace etc). By-
products and side effects of the “governance IPG” may be present, e.g. reduced likelihood of 
war and more neighbourly international relations that result from liberal international trade 
regime (Conybeare, 1984). In international trade governance domain, equilibrium would 
mean full application of GATT/WTO principles, their extension to previously uncovered 
areas (agricultural trade, government procurement, services etc.), the reform of underpinning 
trade policies and practices (specifically outlawing of adversarial practices, such as dumping, 
non-tariff barriers, export subsidization), domestic policy reform (provided that domestic 
policies have spillover effects on international trade) and enforcement of free trade principles. 
The realities of multilateral trade governance clearly demonstrate that at present, such policy 
equilibrium is more a theoretical construct, i.e. liberalization has been partial and incomplete.    
The existence of multiple disequilibria also implies that the equilibration process will 
eliminate them sequentially, rather than at the same time. The regime reform, in this respect, 
will first involve adjustment of existing policies (i.e. elimination of (S2) disequilibrium), 
conducted by few policymakers, without any contentious negotiation with other actors. If 
such adjustment fails, then more radical reform will have to include formation of new 
institutions, as well as more intense policy negotiation. 
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Entrepreneurship is seen as a driving force in establishing international policy equilibrium, 
both when it comes to construction and adjustment of policy settings and instruments, and 
when establishment of underlying institutions is concerned. 
Policy entrepreneurship as equilibration force 
In the public policy literature (Kingdon, 1995; Mintrom, Norman, 2009), policy 
entrepreneurs are defined as actors in the government, interest groups or in research 
organisations who are willing to invest their resources in hope of future return and who have 
motivation to change current ways of doing things in particular policy area. Beyond this 
general definition, the concept of policy entrepreneurship is rather vague. It is acknowledged 
that policy entrepreneurs display social acuity (Mintrom, Norman, 2009: 651), define 
problems and build teams, use policy “windows of opportunity” to enact change, and that 
they possess superior negotiation skills. However, a more formal and elaborate view of policy 
entrepreneurship that would define precise roles and activities of entrepreneurs is lacking.     
We argue that by applying the insights of I. M. Kirzner and J. A. Schumpeter in the field of 
IPG analysis, a more complete and accurate representation can be obtained that: 
1). Emphasizes entrepreneurial function, rather than lists particular entrepreneurs; 
2). Establishes the collective nature of international policy entrepreneurship; and 
3). Identifies generic entrepreneurial functions that are performed in all instances of IPG 
provision. 
According to I. M. Kirzner (1973, 1997), economic actors possess inadequate knowledge of 
the best ways to maximize their utilities and profits. As a consequence, they make inferior 
plans - “either plans that are doomed to disappointment ex post” (over-optimism mistakes) or 
“plans which fail to exploit existing market opportunities” (over-pessimism mistakes). The 
function of entrepreneur is to help correct and improve these plans, by exploiting profit 
opportunities that exist in a market in disequilibrium (e.g. through arbitrage) and leading lead 
economic system to an optimal allocation of resources to more highly valued uses, i.e. to 
equilibrium. 
Similar decision-making ignorance, inferior plans and disequilibria are present in public 
policy. Policy actors may be deficient in attending to policy problem and acting upon it. 
Unsubstantiated expectations about other actors‟ compliance during negotiation may be 
present; over-optimistic assumptions about swiftness of consensus and agreement-making 
may be frequent. A full arsenal of means (negotiation strategies and tactics) to attain policy 
agreement may be left unused and there may be “unpleasant” discoveries that the full 
negotiation process potential has not been exploited, i.e. better moves could have been made, 
or that certain actions should have been avoided. Overall, the realities of policymaking are: 
lengthy agenda setting, protracted issue definition, uneasy consensus-making,  tedious talks 
with  stalemates, reversals and confrontation that delay provision of IPG or preclude 
provision altogether. This justifies and necessitates the exercise of entrepreneurship to correct 
the mistakes and foster agenda setting and negotiation.   
We note that while in original Kirznerian analysis actors make bids and offers over existing 
objects of purchase and sale, in the policy process these objects have to be defined first. 
Actors have to establish whether the conditions should be classified as problems and this can 
become the first source of “over-optimism” in the process. Actors interested in IPG provision 
may find that their arguments about the necessity of the change are not attended to or 
accepted by the opposition, either due to their ignorance or vested interests (e.g. 
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protectionism). They may also mistakenly believe that their policy proposals are attractive to 
the opposition.  
In the case of international trade policy reform, the buyers of the reform (countries interested 
in liberalisation) overoptimistically believe that their offer price is high enough; whereas, the 
sellers (protectionist states) actually consider the price to be too low; thus reform transaction 
does not occur. When talking about reform price, it becomes clear that buyers‟ price is not a 
numerical figure, but rather a bundle of offers and inducements contained in a negotiation 
proposal, which can increase the attractiveness of the latter in the eyes of the reform seller. 
Similarly, the seller price is defined as a set of conditions that a buyer has to fulfil to finalise 
the reform deal.  
Likewise, those actors opposing the change or not interested in IPG provision may find that 
their earlier expectations (that status quo will not be disturbed and that policy issues will not 
be put on agenda) were not realised; they also mistakenly believe that pro-reform actors are 
satisfied with the opposition‟s negotiation position and proposals that reform should not take 
place. 
This situation is analogous to the one, depicted by Kirzner – in both cases (market and policy 
process) overoptimism about actors‟ own plans (prices in the former and policy proposals in 
the latter) and about the willingness of the other side to accept them, leads to subsequent 
frustration; thus, preventing actors from reaching a correct estimate of each other‟s 
willingness to buy and sell. As a result, the purchase-sale transaction does not take place and 
both market and policy systems are in disequilibrium. In the policy system, the lack of 
agreement about the necessity and timing of a transaction and divergence of prices between 
pro- and anti-reform actors prevents them from achieving stable order.  
We hypothesize that Kirznerian coordination to minimise the over-optimism mistake includes 
activities that facilitate agenda formation (persuasion of reluctant actors to tackle the problem 
and identification of external conditions that can assist this task) as well as activities at the 
negotiation stage that moderate negotiation positions and proposals.  
The over-pessimism mistake, mentioned by Kirzner (recognition by buyers/sellers that 
completed transactions had been suboptimal and that they had not fully exploited profit 
opportunities) is also encountered in the policy equilibration context.  
Importantly, the profit opportunities that arise from possibilities for profitable exchange (i.e. 
from spatial and temporal price discrepancies in economic markets or differentials in 
electoral markets) are not present in the policy system. While in the product and factor 
markets there already exist goods with respect to which arbitrage and speculation can be 
performed and profits extracted, in the policy system this good (future policy) has yet to be 
devised during negotiations. However, if we view profit as a potential benefit (rather than an 
exchange discrepancy) for pro-reform actors, that is experienced once the new policy is 
attained, the speedy termination of a negotiation process that would deliver these benefits can 
be seen as a profit opportunity for those actors.  
Kirznerian coordination entrepreneurship will thus include activities to exploit this profit 
opportunity: utilisation of the whole arsenal of strategic and tactical means to foster the 
negotiation process in order to achieve a new policy (both adversarial actions that make the 
opposition more pliant, as well as offers that could benefit all parties). Inability to handle and 
manage the policy negotiation process would then be a failure of Kirznerian entrepreneurship, 
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even if initial consensus to attend to the policy problem and realistic expectations of the 
opposing party‟s position are present. In the case of trade policy reform, the mistake implies 
that “buyers” (those interested in liberalization) have no means to make protectionist 
countries compliant with reform demands. 
We note, following Mises (1996 [1949]: 252-253) and Kirzner (1973: 15) that 
entrepreneurship is a function that can be performed by multiple (or preferably all) actors and 
that Kirznerian policy entrepreneurship can be performed by the same actors who in other 
circumstances could have behaved un-entrepreneurially. Despite this, a mapping of 
entrepreneurial functions with specific actors may be justified given that position of an actor 
(or its mandate and capacity) may influence the degree of entrepreneurship or make particular 
entrepreneurial functions more likely. 
The paper also adopts the concept of entrepreneurship developed by J. A. Schumpeter (1961 
[1911], 1987 [1942], 2008 [1939]). In Schumpeter‟s original formulation, entrepreneur is 
seen as an agent that brings novelties into the economic system by means of leadership, 
thereby overhauling entire economic sectors and opening new avenues for economic 
development. 
Schumpeter (1987 [1942]) argued that entrepreneurial leadership is a phenomenon that can 
also be encountered in both economic realm and in politics and public decision making. 
“Collectives act almost exclusively by accepting leadership – this is the dominant mechanism 
of practically any collective action.” (p. 270) 
Schumpeter purports that the behaviour of economic and political leaders-entrepreneurs is 
characterised by radicalism, with which both types position themselves in the surrounding 
economic and political environment. Instead of working in the deadwood of existing political 
structures, the Schumpeterian political leader would radically change the political terrain. 
Similarly to the Schumpeterian economic entrepreneur, making qualitative non-incremental 
changes in the economic system (introducing new products, developing new production 
methods, discovering new markets or devising new organisational methods), the 
Schumpeterian political entrepreneur makes major punctuations in the political system. 
Schumpeter‟s idea that leaders are driven by predominantly non-material impulses and are 
not pure wealth maximisers finds application in international public policy. The motives of 
top leaders include preservation of good relations with other countries to which provision of 
IPG (e.g. those that help resolving trade conflicts) could contribute; or construction of 
agreements that would allow progress in other areas and with other IPGs. The possibility of 
the exercise of leadership at lower levels of the government was not mentioned by 
Schumpeter. Following Mintrom and Norman (2009) and Stiller (2010), however, we 
consider leadership by expert community and external stakeholders who may be interested in 
genuine social and policy improvements (ideational leadership), or even by pro-reform 
bureaucratic factions who are less corrupted by vested interests. 
Regarding the mechanism of entrepreneurial leadership in the context of IPG provision, we 
posit that it involves radical reconfiguration of the international policy domain (in line with 
Schumpeter‟s original view). At the pre-negotiation stage of IPG provision, the 
reconfiguration of the domain is achieved by injecting and forcing new interpretations of 
policy problems and new policy ideas and thereby setting desired agenda for policy formation 
in a system that is dominated by pro-status quo actors. At the negotiation stage, when 
divisions between pro- and anti-reform actors widen and the reform is delayed, 
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entrepreneurial leaders can reconfigure the talks: intervene into the political wrangle, make 
crucial decisions themselves and thus bring reform into existence.  
We note that Schumpeter did not confine his analysis of entrepreneurship to the exercise of 
leadership. While in earlier works the accent was put on a heroic industrial leader as initiator 
and carrier of innovation and on “creative destruction” processes in the economy, in later 
works Schumpeter (2008 [1939]) recognised that entrepreneurship can be exercised 
collectively (e.g. in corporate entities), inducing discontinuities and disruptions of a smaller 
magnitude, with technological innovation taking incremental form (“creative accumulation” 
process). 
We argue that this second facet of entrepreneurship can be discovered in the IPG delivery 
process. While the Schumpeterian political leader continues to be important (challenging the 
ideational foundations of policy or forcing negotiations into the desired direction), many 
policy innovations can be brought by recombinant activities of Schumpeterian policy 
entrepreneurs. Actors conduct trial-and-error tinkering with policy elements and mechanisms 
(adjust instruments, redefine short term goals and targets, without changing the underlying 
ideational and institutional core) and create new analytical instruments that could be helpful 
in discussions at agenda setting stage. Also, in the negotiation setting, entrepreneurs construct 
agreement from available proposals, submissions and designs of parties to negotiation. 
Another insight present in Schumpeter‟s later works is that innovation is a combination of 
knowledge drawn from different sources. Significant port ion of innovation in modern 
capitalist economies results from collective incremental activities of a large number of quite 
unremarkable actors (rather than heroic figures) within or outside the firm. In a similar vein 
we hypothesize that policy novelties can be made by non-policymakers, by actors somewhat 
extrinsic to the core of the policy system, e.g. by the expert community. Their contribution, 
while not radical or decisive as such, can nonetheless have significant repercussions for the 
policy formation process and IPG delivery. 
Overall, three types of international policy entrepreneurship are distinguished: Kirznerian 
facilitation and coordination, Schumpeterian leadership, and Schumpeterian recombination.  
Complementarity of entrepreneurial functions 
In contrast to Loasby (1982) who considered Kirznerian and Schumpeterian entrepreneurship 
as fundamentally different types of action, and Choi (1995) who postulated similarity 
between two types (Kirznerian entrepreneur operating in single-period and Schumpeterian in 
multiple-period markets), the complementarity view advanced by Boudreaux (1994) looks 
more plausible. The means to achieve equilibrium are diverse and both types of 
entrepreneurship move economy towards equilibrium: Schumpeterian entrepreneur by 
innovating and bringing qualitative improvements in the economy, Kirznerian by improving 
operation of the markets. In the international public policy realm, both types would be 
instrumental in providing IPGs. The Schumpeterian entrepreneur would “produce” new 
policy and “lead” the provisioning process, whereas the Kirznerian would “facilitate” and 
“coordinate” it.  
Taxonomy of entrepreneurs in international trade governance 
Acknowledging the primacy of entrepreneurial function over particular entrepreneurial actor 
we consider what agents performed the aforementioned entrepreneurial functions. 
GATT/WTO domain is examined as a specific case. 
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The argument is that the same people (or groups) can perform several types of 
entrepreneurship. Trade ministers and representatives may act as Schumpeterian leaders and 
at the same type may help devise negotiation proposals (Schumpeterian recombination). 
WTO Director General has the ability to use his power to direct the negotiation process and 
influence the negotiation outcome (Schumpeterian leadership), and can also behave as a 
mediator and initiator of discussions, thus detecting policy discrepancies and facilitating the 
negotiation process (Kirznerian coordination and facilitation). Also, although not part of the 
mandate, he could participate (and de facto frequently did this) in the negotiation process, by 
making negotiation proposals (Schumpeter recombination). 
Similarly, a particular entrepreneurial function can be performed by multiple actors with 
interests in the policy outcome. Apart from bureaucratic entrepreneurship (Murphy, 1971; 
Ebner, 2006: 507), entrepreneurship by external stakeholders (defined as all actors apart from 
government bureaucrats and international officials), this has been a common practice in 
numerous international talks (Sebenius, 1984: 18; Betsill, Corell, 2001; Bruhl, 2010: 181-
199). 
In the GATT/WTO trade talks, four types of actors likely to perform Kirznerian and 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurial functions are distinguished: a) top domestic political leaders 
(heads of state and ministers); b) top international bureaucrats (officials in the WTO 
Secretariat, WTO Director General); c) middle level political figures – national negotiators 
and domestic bureaucrats (located across national trade policy systems); and d) external 
stakeholders, including the community of policy economists. 
Firstly, in contrast to other higher priority areas or IPGs, such as national security that witness 
greater involvement of top figures, the involvement of top national figures in trade 
negotiations tends to be sporadic and occasional occurring mostly at agenda-setting stage or 
at times when there is a negotiation deadlock threatening broader relations. In the former case, 
top national decision makers are able to initiate change in policy regime by framing policy 
issues in a new way and proposing new ideas (e.g. the agenda-setting activities by J. F. 
Kennedy on the eve of the GATT Round named after him; Mork, 2011: 9-13); in the latter 
case, their involvement was pivotal in fostering or competing negotiations (the intervention 
by L. Johnson and J. Carter, as shown below). In both cases, holding substantial political 
power, they acted as Schumpeterian leaders. 
Secondly, international trade policy bureaucrats, due to their mandate (to act as a guardians of 
the GATT; to explore the problem areas in international trade policy; to mediate the interests 
of contracting parties; and to manage the everyday activities of the GATT, Long, 1985), had 
genuine interest in preservation of the existing GATT regime but also in its strengthening and 
broadening. Given the mandate, their entrepreneurship was more likely to be a Kirznerian 
facilitation and coordination. We argue, however, that in addition to Kirznerian functions 
which were performed ex officio, GATT bureaucrats also acted as Schumpeterian leaders, 
advancing negotiations, breaking the deadlocks, and “producing” international policy through 
own submission of proposals. These additional activities (as shown further) differed in 
intensity across the rounds. 
Thirdly, the degree of entrepreneurship by the middle level domestic bureaucrats was lower 
than by other actors (given the tight relations between protectionist interests and domestic 
bureaucracies). Nonetheless, Kirznerian consensus building entrepreneurship was made 
possible.  For instance, in the case of agricultural policy in the GATT Uruguay Round, 
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while the majority of the national bureaucrats were anti-reformist, the pre-negotiation stage 
witnessed the rise of pro-reform bureaucrats, who contributed substantially to placing 
agriculture on the Uruguay Round agenda. At the core of their Kirznerian entrepreneurship 
was the building of domestic consensus regarding the desirability of laissez faire agricultural 
policies. Although it is possible (and is done frequently) for domestic pro-reform bureaucrats 
to impose their will on anti-reform bureaucrats (i.e. to act as Schumpeterian leaders), we 
argue that the reality of agricultural policy making (both in the EC and the USA) was 
different: consultation, persuasion and collaboration, rather than use of confrontational 
tactics, were preponderant. Entrepreneurship by national bureaucrats continued at negotiation 
stage, where, in addition to Kirznerian consensus building, they were acting as 
Schumpeterian recombinant entrepreneurs, constructing agreement by submitting negotiation 
proposals of varying quality. 
Fourthly, regarding external stakeholders, their involvement and entrepreneurship in the 
negotiation process is linked to the issue in question: in highly technical negotiations (e.g. on 
arms control or on militarisation of space) the number of external stakeholders will be limited 
and these would include a small club of specialists on the issue. Other socially sensitive 
negotiations (e.g. on climate change) would include a wide range of stakeholders (NGOs, 
various public figures), usually highly motivated, driven by deep-rooted beliefs and ideology, 
and appealing to public opinion. 
We argue that trade negotiations have features of both technical complexity and political 
sensitivity (clearly, some trade negotiations, such as those on genetically modified organisms 
and food safety, are more politically divisive; whereas others, such as intellectual property 
rights negotiations, involve complex legal and scientific issues). The WTO Doha Round talks 
involved substantial political controversy and wide participation of external stakeholders due 
to its development orientation, the active position of the developing nations and the rise of the 
anti-globalist movement. In contrast, during the GATT Uruguay Round talks the involvement 
of external actors was more limited in scope, more depoliticised and technically oriented. 
There existed some ambiguity about how to operationalise certain issues (e.g. define the 
levels of agricultural protection) and which trade issues to bring to the table. Substantial 
preliminary work in issue definition and quantification of the protection levels were required, 
and thus the involvement of professionals in a specific regulatory area (rather than general 
public or groups, interested in political outcome) was natural. Of several possible types of 
specialists, two stand out - lawyers and economists. 
The entrepreneurship by lawyers concerned the codification of the international trade law 
(e.g. preparation of the Code on Export Subsidies during GATT Tokyo Round); interdiction 
of adversarial trade practices such as the use of anti-dumping and countervailing duties. The 
entrepreneurial activities of lawyers were also salient with respect to legally undefined trade 
practices – before such trade issues, as intellectual property, investments and services were 
included in the Uruguay Round agenda, the possible agreement templates and potential rules 
had already been discussed by legal scholars in academic journals and conferences 
(Hampson, Hart, 1995: 194-196). Codification and the write up of new rules have been an 
example of Schumpeterian recombination.  
Despite trade protectionism being an economic problem, the involvement of economists was 
limited in the early GATT years (in contrast to inter-war period, when trade economists 
assisted in germinating the idea of multilateral trade governance; Endres, Fleming, 2002). 
One of the reasons was organizational: the GATT lacked similar employment opportunities 
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for economists that existed in IMF and World Bank; hence the services of external 
economists were used most frequently. A more important problem was a gap that existed 
between theoretical research in international trade and applied research that could be useful in 
practical policymaking (Evenett, 2007). Many diagnostic analyses were left underutilized 
(e.g. 1957 report by G. Haberler, J. Tinbergen and R. de Oliveira Campos on the state of 
agricultural protectionism) due to the lack of operational concepts and estimates. The advent 
of computable general equilibrium modelling and applied econometrics allowed closing the 
gap and increased the role of economic advice. As shown below, this latter activity was a 
manifestation of Schumpeterian recombinant entrepreneurship. 
4. The process of IPG provision 
We conceive IPG provision as a complex phenomenon that involves entrepreneurial activity 
1). At both domestic and international levels; 2). During agenda setting (pre-negotiation) and 
negotiation stages; 3). During the accompanying institutional change. We also note certain 
behaviour factors and frames that may constrain policy entrepreneurship (the interaction of 
behavioural, institutional and entrepreneurship variables is a promising research issue not 
examined here).  
Entrepreneurship and five agenda setting streams 
The multiple streams model formulated by Kingdon (1995) consider three streams of 
activities during the agenda-setting: problem recognition and framing (problems stream), the 
proposal of solutions to the problem (alternatives stream), and political developments within 
the policy community (politics stream). These streams, being independent most of the time, 
may get coupled by entrepreneurs, thus bringing substantial policy changes. The involvement 
of entrepreneurs is rather discrete: “to lie in wait, in and around government with their 
solutions already in hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their 
solutions, waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their advantage.” 
(p. 165).  
We argue that 1). There are more streams than in Kingdon‟s original model; 2) A specific 
type of entrepreneurship is associated with each stream; and 3) The relation between the 
streams is more complex than in Kingdon‟s original conceptualisation. 
Regarding agenda setting stage, we distinguish five activity streams with a specific type of 
entrepreneurship associated with each stream: 
1) Problem framing stream, including efforts of certain actors to challenge existing 
policy ideas and interpretations of policy reality, by introducing and advancing 
alternative interpretations. The process may potentially culminate in some commonly 
held interpretation which by no means has to be brought in by consent (rather than 
conflict and contestation) and upon which further discussions at the negotiation stage 
can be based. The analysis of activities in this stream will help in understanding how 
institutions are formed.  
2) Experimentation/learning stream, involving activities of actors to eliminate or reduce 
the magnitude of inconsistencies that pervade the existing policy mechanism (e.g. 
various internal malfunctioning, tenuous relations with external environment or with 
changed aspirations and demands of policy recipients). The analysis of this stream 
helps to establish whether understanding has been formed among policy actors that all 
possibilities for improvements have been exhausted in the existing policy and that 
more radical measures and changes are warranted. 
 16 
 
3) Advocacy stream, consisting of activities to foster the above two streams, by building 
an encompassing coalition (or coalition that is sufficiently inclusive to play a decisive 
role in agenda setting) that shares the same understanding of policy reality and holds 
similar opinion about actions to be made. The analysis of this stream will expose the 
slack in the system and the gap that exists between the first realisation that problems 
exist and the appearance of the first alternative ideas, and the point when a policy 
agenda is firmly installed. 
4) Operationalisation stream, including activities to create instruments and analytical 
apparatuses that will help actors to get a clearer idea of what the problems, solutions 
and whole discussion are about. These activities have a facilitative nature and are 
analogous to creating “language”, making agenda setting communications and 
discussions easier. 
5) Contextualisation stream, composed of activities that relate internal agenda setting 
controversies with exigencies of external political and economic environment. Actors 
in this stream will evaluate the state of the agenda setting debate and identify 
exogenous requirements that have to be satisfied. Thereby it will be determined when 
exactly the agenda setting processes have to be cut short and debates moved into the 
negotiation domain. In other words, this stream establishes the exact timing of 
negotiation and the major turning point in regime change process. 
We hypothesize that problem framing and institutional formation requires initiative and 
mobilisation on the part of some actors as well as their ability to impose (by using various 
tactics) their interpretations of “what is happening” and of “what ought to be done” on the 
rest of the policy system. Hence, Schumpeterian entrepreneurial leadership is warranted. The 
essence of leadership in this stream is in framing and counter-framing “to rebut, undermine, 
or neutralise a person‟s or a group‟s versions of reality, or interpretative framework” and to 
subsequently suggest different actions and solutions (Benford, Snow, 2000: 626). The 
principal objective of holders of counter-frames is not merely to inform others about 
alternatives, but to disseminate counter-frames and make others adopt them, i.e. to radically 
reconfigure institutional (and subsequently policy) domain. This is in line with Schumpeter‟s 
original view of leader-entrepreneur, driven mainly by non-material impulses (Fagerberg, 
2003: 132). Specifically, counter-framing would involve normative de-legitimisation of 
existing policy ideology, targeted to present the latter as inappropriate in the eyes of society 
(Benford, Snow, 2000: 614-616). The rhetorical appeals to “follow the right way” and to 
desist from currently held frames would likely be usual tactics.  The effectiveness of 
framing would likely be conditioned by the resonance of entrepreneurs‟ arguments (ability to 
attract attention of other players and top decision makers), in turn affected by the frame‟s 
consistency (identification of the precise link between specific activities and adverse 
outcomes) and credibility (persuasiveness of the critique). Following Benford and Snow 
(2000) and Hoffman and Ocasio (2001: 420-426), we argue that internally consistent 
(offering clear cut interpretations of what is wrong and why it has to be tackled in a particular 
way) and credible (not contradicting world events and reality and not advanced solely for 
demagogical and politicking purposes) frames are likely to be more resonant. 
The failure of International Trade Organisation (ITO) proposal in the 1940s is an illustration 
of poor framing entrepreneurship. The interpretation of the post-war economic problems 
proposed by the USA was perceived inadequate by most other economies: while US trade 
negotiators saw protectionism as a cause of the prolonged Great Depression and protracted 
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post-war reconstruction, other parties considered lack of government intervention and 
aggregate demand deficiencies as a root of the problem (Trofimov, 2012).  
In contrast, the framing by D. Stockman, Director of the US Office of Management and 
Budget, was instrumental in changing US position in agricultural trade negotiations during 
GATT Uruguay Round (Spitze, Flinchbaugh, 1994). Stockman‟s frame (agricultural 
protection as one of the reasons of rising budget deficit and as a practice that is incompatible 
with free market mechanisms) resonated well with economic views of Pres. Reagan and 
aligned well with interpretations of the US economic problems by Congress members.  
In other GATT rounds, incompatible frames were likewise observed. During Kennedy 
Round, J. F. Kennedy‟s vision of free trade as an instrument to strengthen trans-Atlantic 
alliance and prevent isolationist tendencies in Western Europe was countered by C. de 
Gaulle‟s vision of Europe as strong independent force (Mork, 2011: 12-13).   
The experimentation/learning stream requires that actors are able to recombine and tinker 
with the policy mechanism and its constitutive elements. Hence Schumpeterian recombinant 
entrepreneurship is necessary. Various unanticipated anomalies in the policy system (failures 
within the policy mechanism as well as tensions that appear between it and other policies, 
policy stakeholders and recipients) give rise to reactions and responses by policymakers, i.e. 
policy learning. The latter is defined as deliberate attempts to adjust the goals or techniques 
of policy in light of these anomalies (Hall, 1993: 278). Hall distinguishes three orders of 
required changes and responses: changes made to the setting of existing instruments (first 
order change), adoption of new instruments (second order change), and modification of goals 
(third order change). The third one becomes inevitable if policy malfunctioning persists 
despite changes made to policy instruments. May (1992: 337) and Steen and Groenewegen 
(2008: 2, 7) argue that in the presence of radical uncertainty (associated with lack of 
knowledge of how to eliminate policy anomalies) the only way out of the situation for 
policymakers is to explore other policy paths, or to experiment through trial-and-error. 
Following Oliver and Pemberton (2004) we argue that Schumpeterian recombinant 
entrepreneurs, with varying degree of success will attempt to cope with policy anomalies.  
They can manage to return the policy system to its original equilibrium, and hence the change 
process stops with all other streams rendered unnecessary. If not, an alternative policy regime 
– one with both new instruments and new goals – will become brought in after a period of 
learning and tinkering. In this case, the learning/experimentation stream has to be supported 
by a problem framing stream.  “The triumph of a new policy framework depends 
(obviously) on a workable new idea (or more likely, a set of ideas) being available” (Oliver, 
Pemberton, 2004: 5), i.e. by a stable frame. At the same time both framing stream and 
learning and experimentation could be assisted by Kirznerian advocacy and coalition building 
entrepreneurship. 
The recalcitrant position of the EC in the GATT Uruguay Round agricultural talks was to 
large extend a result of unsuccessful experimentation with its domestic agricultural policies. 
Tinkering with the existing policy through supply side measures rather than reform of the 
price system (that was the cause of agricultural surpluses, export subsidisation and trade 
wars) and creation of new policy based on different principles and institutions were not a case 
of Schumpeterian recombinant entrepreneurship, but rather an attempt to save an old system 
by making minor adjustments to instruments (Fennell, 1997: 73, 161).   
The objective of entrepreneurship in the advocacy stream is to bridge opposing positions as 
to the necessity of regime change and attempt to persuade opponents. Entrepreneurship is 
likely to take form of Kirznerian facilitation and coordination. (We note inter alia that these 
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activities are not limited to the agenda setting stage, but are equally important during 
negotiations, when reduction of the distance between negotiation proposals has to come 
about). Coalition-building and advocacy would support framing entrepreneurship, given that 
opposition has to be persuaded to accept new frames (no matter how credible and consistent 
they are); it will also support experimentation and learning, given that these may be too 
gradual and could have proceeded much faster if supported by an encompassing political 
coalition. Following Hutter (1986), Kuran (1988) and Gladwell (2000) we argue that in many 
instances pro-reform coalition may be built by working through bureaucratic apparatus and 
its segments; and by performing value and ideology-based lobbying (i.e. lobbying that fosters 
change by non-confrontational means, persuasion and dialogue). Examples of the former may 
include bureau reorganisation, targeting a few critical bureaucrats or agencies that are 
sympathetic to reform, recruiting new members into the pro-reform faction, “shopping 
venues” (targeting various agencies or government branches). Examples of the latter could 
include establishing forums or venues where pro-change idea is crystallised and formulated 
by like-minded actors (Hutter called them “conversation circles”). Kuran (1988) and 
Gladwell (2000) mention “critical mass” and threshold effects, i.e. the success of consensus 
building and pro-change advocacy hinges upon progressive expansion of the forum and 
inclusion of actors who are initially less amicable to change idea. Given that the core of the 
entrenched belief system is deeply anti-reformist in many cases and the strength of this core 
is formidable, the intensity of persuasion is unlikely to deliver quick effects. We align with 
Meier and Durrer (1992) and argue that depoliticising the policy discussion and tackling 
some practical and pragmatic aspects of the problem would be a key to building a grand pro-
reform coalition. It should be noted that advocacy and coalition-building process can be 
assisted by the fragmentation and demise of existing policies and institutions (due to counter-
framing efforts and policy anomalies), i.e. relation between advocacy and framing and 
learning/experimentation streams is bi-directional.  
The movement away from protectionist agricultural policies and pro-liberalisation stance of 
the USA in the Uruguay Round were to large extent the result of swift and effective advocacy 
and consensus-building, with “critical mass” effect reached rather quickly. Starting in 1981 in 
a narrow circle of like-mined senators (J. Helms, T. Foley, W. Alexander) and D. Stockman, 
it initially concerned limitation of budget outlays on broader agricultural programs and 
weakening entrenched urban-rural coalition (food stamps program linked with and farm 
support programs). Further on, the testimony by agricultural experts (Alex McCalla, Edward 
Schuh, F. H. Sanderson, B. L. Gardner) was instrumental in changing the stance of 
legislators, by indicating the links between domestic and international aspects of the policy, 
and importantly highlighting potential benefits from reduction of domestic farm supports and 
more pliant bargaining position in GATT talks (increased agricultural exports as a direct 
result of liberal international policies, or increased services exports as a by-product). Later, 
the coalition was expanded by including USDA Secretary John R. Block and Commerce 
Secretaries, John O‟Mara and Clayton Yeutter, responsible for upcoming multilateral 
negotiations (US Congress, 1981; US Congress, 1983; US Congress, 1986). Such coalition 
was lacking in the EC, explaining the delays in the Uruguay Round agricultural talks and 
important role of entrepreneurship by top EC leaders to overcome opposition to free 
agricultural trade.     
The construction of new instruments and “language” in the operationalisation stream makes 
it necessary that actors (specifically, expert community) innovate; therefore, Schumpeterian 
recombination has to take place. Slembeck (1997) and Evenett (2007) mention the cognitive 
and behavioural distance between the “world” of politicians and the “world” of economists, 
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with politicians pointing to the lack of knowledge of political and administrative system by 
economists, and economists blaming politicians for inefficiency and irrationality. Reduction 
of this distance is achieved by Schumpeterian operationalisation entrepreneurship. Its essence 
is the creation of analytical instruments, models and empirical studies based on them, as well 
as the construction of frameworks that could facilitate policymaking. The former is required 
because applied economic concepts that could be used in policymaking have to be distilled 
from the body of economic theory and adapted to policy realities. The latter is necessary 
because policymakers are frequently deficient in their ability to organise and arrange issues 
for talks (advice by economists on the issues that are the most/the least divisive or distorting 
in economic sense can be instrumental in this case). We argue that effectiveness of 
operationalisation entrepreneurship was achieved when empirical estimates and figures that 
had been presented to policy makers allowed for a more concrete and specific policy reform 
discussion. Entrepreneurship was particularly effective in instances when policy economists 
managed, in addition to providing crude aggregate estimates of welfare, to address in their 
empirical studies the changes in specific variables of importance to policymakers and the 
wider community (unemployment rate, inequality and the like), thus scattering the doubts 
about negative impacts of policy change. 
The success of Uruguay Round in fostering agricultural trade liberalisation to a large extent 
was a result of particularly intense entrepreneurship and recombinant activities by 
economists. This was in sharp contrast to Dillon and Kennedy Round, when report by a group 
of economists (“Harberler Report”) did not go further beyond mere diagnostic of the 
agricultural trade policy problem and broad recommendations (Haberler, 1958). At the start 
of the Uruguay Round, a number of analytical instruments were devised and applied to assist 
policymakers: encompassing measures of agricultural support, Producer Subsidy Equivalents 
(PSE) and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents (CSE), to indicate the overall scale of distortions; 
as well as equivalence measures between quantitative supports and tariffs (that later allowed 
more meaningful bargaining and concessions over particular instruments). General 
equilibrium models facilitated discussion over liberalisation scenarios, country-specific and 
social impacts (OECD, 1982; IATRC, 1988/1989). 
Finally, in contextualisation stream, the recognition of the right timing for the conclusion of 
agenda setting and the start of negotiations requires that actors are alert enough to discern this 
moment. The alertness ability is central to Kirzner‟s view of entrepreneurship: alertness is 
defined as awareness of opportunities and “of what has been overlooked” and the ability “in 
seeing through the fog created by the uncertainty of the future” (Kirzner, 1997: 51). Ability to 
detect propitious moments for policy change or for moving policymaking forward is thus a 
manifestation of Kirznerian entrepreneurship. Snyder and Diesing (1977) distinguish 
integrative and distributive crises: the former being exogenous situations that threaten the 
distribution of gains and losses across a policy domain, thereby leading to differential 
willingness of parties to tackle it through cooperation; the latter defined as situations that 
enhance perceptions of mutual vulnerability and possible joint losses and that promote the 
idea that minimisation of adverse effects requires joint effort. They likewise distinguished 
specific and general crises: the former affecting a limited number of actors domestically or 
internationally; the latter affecting everyone located in the international po licy system. Also 
the crises at different stages of the “life cycle” are defined: nascent crises or wake-up calls, 
not requiring immediate attention; chronic crises; and acute crises. We argue that Kirznerian 
entrepreneurship in the contextualisation stream takes place when agents start to perceive 
adverse exogenous developments as an integrative, general and acute crisis, i.e. expose high 
degree of alertness and act accordingly to initiate/foster the change. 
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The ITO proposal (and the idea of comprehensive liberalisation embedded in it) was not 
considered as the priority in the late 1940s. The economic growth revived in Europe (with the 
help of Marshall Plan and Keynesian policies) and other developments are crises came to the 
agenda - the onset of Cold War and Korean War. The grand liberalisation was not seen as 
necessary or pressing, thus compromising Kirznerian entrepreneurship in the 
contextualisation stream (indeed the early GATT rounds in the 1940s that were conducted 
parallel to ITO talks were seen sufficient in bringing in trade liberalisation).  
In contrast, the start of the agricultural trade talks in the GATT in 1986 was a result from a 
dire situation: trade war between the USA and the EC and cut-throat competition in 
agricultural export markets, that negatively affected broader Transatlantic relations, massive 
agricultural surpluses and budgetary outlays on agricultural support, GATT judicial 
mechanism under strain etc. 
Entrepreneurship during negotiation stage 
Negotiation literature tends to examine negotiation outcomes from structural, strategic, 
processual, behavioural and integrative perspectives (Zartman, 1988; Druckman, 1997). In 
the structural approach, the power of the parties, the relational context and the setting of 
negotiation come to the forefront. In the strategic model, the goals of the parties, the payoffs, 
and rational choice among alternative courses of action are accentuated. Behavioural 
approach emphasises the negotiators‟ personalities and negotiating styles, as well as the role 
of persuasion, culture, perceptions, motivation and other qualitative variables. The patterns of 
concession-making, the reactions to opponents‟ bids and offers and the learning about 
concessions‟ exchanges are the essence of the processual approach. Integrative models stress 
collective decision-making and conflict resolution efforts and focus on value creation in 
negotiations (as opposed to value claiming). In addition, the view of negotiation as 
organisational process (specifically a process of complexity reduction) is advanced (Winham, 
1977).  
Fostering negotiations and bringing in required outcomes can thus be ensured by the increase 
in bargaining power, superior strategic and tactical action, by means of cooperative attitudes. 
However, when it comes to comes to achieving timely and mutually-satisfactory completion 
of negotiation, a different set of instruments is likely to be most effective: the management of 
the negotiation process, collective search for mutually acceptable solutions and avoidance of 
unattractive solutions, formulation of negotiating rules and procedures, structuring of talks, 
prioritization of the issues and the like. These latter instruments (which are a common thread 
in organisational process and integrative approaches) need further and more in -depth 
explanation. International policy entrepreneurship, in our opinion, is a natural extension of 
the organisational process view. 
We note that the view of negotiation as an organisational process envisages the creation of 
rules and routines, the following of a programmed set of operations, the incremental building 
of a negotiation package (Winham, 1977: 98-100). Most negotiations, being complex 
undertakings, will involve these activities; however, wide variation in outcomes and in the 
time spent or reaching the agreements would require consideration of entrepreneurship as an 
intermediate variable. It is not the organisational process (management of the negotiation) as 
such, but rather an exercise of entrepreneurship (qualitative improvements taking the form of 
facilitation, recombination or leadership) that increase the speed of negotiation and bring 
quality outcomes. Indeed, both Kirzner and Schumpeter make a distinct ion between routine 
behaviour within a particular setting, and deliberate actions to change the setting and correct 
inconsistencies in the setting. The exercise of entrepreneurship is implicit in organisational 
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process theory, but needs further analysis (Winham, 1977: 100-107): problem-solving search 
necessitates Schumpeterian tinkering and experimentation, while the reconciliation of 
conflicting positions (that, according to Winham, is a mechanical and programmed process) 
is performed through Schumpeterian leadership and Kirznerian facilitation. (Whether 
negotiations resemble mechanical process, or in contrast require greater entrepreneurship is a 
separate issue to be explored).  
The time spent and efforts made to complete a negotiation may serve as an indicator of the 
intensity of entrepreneurship, with talks competed in timely manner suggesting the policy 
entrepreneurship had been exercised. This, however, may not be a perfect indicator, as parties 
could complete negotiation by leaving certain important (and divisive) issues aside (as was 
the case in Tokyo Round, when agricultural policy matters were postponed and put in a 
separate negotiation group, and as a result were left unregulated, Winham, 1986: 95). Thus, 
the lengthy Uruguay Round (1986-94) is an indication of high complexity of talks (and hence 
a high degree of entrepreneurship, rather than its absence). A better indicator of 
entrepreneurship would be the quality of IPG, i.e. the stability of the negotiated governance 
regime, the absence of conflicts following its negotiation, the comprehensiveness and 
sophistication of policy instruments. Clearly, the ever-present dilemma exists between 
entrepreneurship types – facilitation and leadership may reduce negotiation period and lower 
the costs of IPG provision at the expense of innovation and IPG quality (e.g. comparison of 
GATT Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, the latter being a qualitative leap in international trade 
governance).  
At the negotiation stage of the IPG provision Kirznerian entrepreneurship remains important. 
It involves facilitative activities to overcome domestic opposition to liberal policies (through 
the use of various influence instruments in domestic political environments) and to build 
domestic consensus through less conflictual means, as well as to foster collaboration between 
contracting parties. The importance of considering both negotiation tables (negotiation with 
international counterparts and negotiation with domestic constituents) was highlighted by 
Putnam (1988). Pointing to domestic constraints that prevent policy makers from making 
concessions and concluding agreements, Putnam also considered the ways to overcome these 
constraints, e.g. by constructing ratifiable agreements through linkage of issues and 
negotiation areas, by making domestic side payments to own constituents and induce them 
ratify agreement, and also by attempting to inflict necessary changes in the domestic policy 
system of the counterparts. The latter means was studied extensively by Schoppa (1997): 
synergistic strategies, i.e. strategies targeted not directly at the opponent in international 
negotiations, but rather used to modify domestic preferences, were seen as power tools to 
move negotiation forward.  
We argue that this manipulation of domestic constraints (Schoppa mentions four synergistic 
strategies - threats, reverberation, restructuring of domestic constraints and tying hands) and 
the exercise of strategic influence is a mechanism of Kirznerian entrepreneurship. While 
taking the form of dialogue-based advocacy and coalition-building and involving 
bureaucratic regrouping at the agenda-setting stage, at negotiation stage it was a combination 
of inducements and threats. In both instances, the ultimate goal was to correct over-optimism 
and over-pessimism mistakes and facilitate the policymaking process.     
Kirznerian entrepreneurship is supplemented by Schumpeterian-type activities.  
Firstly, international bureaucrats (e.g. in GATT/WTO, IMF or UN) and, to a much lesser 
extent, national negotiators, may manage to submit innovative proposals that could mark a 
departure from the earlier protectionist stance (Schumpeterian recombinant entrepreneurship 
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constructing a new policy). During international trade talks policy recombinant entrepreneurs 
also build from bits and pieces of their own and other negotiators‟ proposals some agreement 
that could resolve international trade policy contradictions and deliver an IPG.  
Secondly, the activities of top national and international officials bring necessary leadership 
and political will to successfully conclude the negotiation and sign the agreement that will 
bring IPG into being, i.e. they behave as Schumpeterian leaders-entrepreneurs. 
Regarding Schumpeterian recombination at negotiation stage, it is necessary to distinguish 
between a routine and an entrepreneurial approach to negotiations. The former, which is the 
most common type of behaviour during negotiations, is responsible for most of its deadlocks 
and stalemates. There exist several manifestations of this approach. Firstly, as most 
negotiations involve several issues and variables to agree upon, the negotiators behaving 
routinely frequently attempt to embrace all issues and variables at once. Secondly, routine 
negotiators are usually influenced by some divisive trade conflicts and problems that 
preceded negotiation and react by attempting to solve these conflicts first, although it might 
have been preferable to concentrate on other less “toxic” issues. Thirdly, routine negotiators 
are unable to extend their decision-making horizons to see how the agreement would look as 
a whole. In contrast, Schumpeterian recombinant entrepreneur would construct proposals and 
agreement by breaking the complexity of the negotiation issue into workable and manageable 
parts and prioritising them, depending on their potential to block negotiation (least 
obstructive first, most obstructive last), while at the same time seeing a bigger picture and 
broader context of the talks. These activities would obviously hinge on entrepreneur‟s ability 
to see ex ante which agreement of proposal will prove superior and instrumental in 
concluding negotiation and delivering IPG. As put by Schumpeter (1961 [1911]: 85) 
“intuition, the capacity of seeing things in a way which afterwards proves to be true” is a core 
quality of a recombinant entrepreneur, making him/her different from non-entrepreneurs, who 
are deficient in this respect and make the above mentioned mistakes. 
Many of the GATT/WTO rounds were opened in a non-imaginative, “routine” fashion, with 
the most recent divisive trade problems occupying the agenda (Grains Agreement wrangle 
and “American Selling Price”/ASP conflict in chemical sector talks during the Kennedy 
Round, or US Export Enhancement Program during the Uruguay Round) and dictating 
particular treatment of other issues, thereby initially decreasing the possibility of a qualitative 
breakthrough in early stages (Lee, 1999: 111-2). Additional explanation to the lack of 
progress initially could be the setbacks in problem framing, operationalisation and other 
problems carried from the agenda-setting stage. The tasks of resolving trade conflicts and of 
writing trade rules (provision of IPG) were frequently completed in parallel, and for some 
time the entrepreneurial efforts were diverted from a principal task. 
The cursory and exploratory look at the GATT/WTO rounds suggests that they differed in 
terms of the overall degree of intensity of entrepreneurship, its strength at particular stages of 
the negotiation and it effectiveness. As put by Winham, the standard approach in each round 
was to reorganise the talks into specific working groups (Winham, 1979: 197-8). 
Entrepreneurial efforts were coming to fore, when negotiations reached deadlock.  
For instance, in the Kennedy Round (1963-67), GATT Director General E. Wyndham-White 
took initiative in both formal and informal groups in May 1967 during the final stage of the 
round. The least divisive issues (cotton textiles, and most of the industrial products) were 
dealt with first, while the most divisive (chemicals and agriculture) treated last. After that, 
Wyndham-White devised a complex deal – conversion of ASP to normal valuation system to 
calculate duties, coupled with reduction of road taxes in Belgium, France and Italy, tobacco 
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preferences in the UK, and reductions in various non-trade barriers (La Barca, 2016: 7-8; 
Coppolaro, 2013: 195). 
In contrast, during Tokyo Round, the entrepreneurship by GATT Director General (O. Long) 
was limited: Tallberg (2006: 189-90) mentions that no zone of agreement existed in early 
stages, while at later stages such zone was wide. Thus, facilitation was not possible at early 
stages, and was not needed at later stages. In addition, the approach by O. Long was to allow 
US and EC negotiators sort out problematic issues informally (Hampson, Hart, 1995: 191). 
In the Uruguay Round, the leadership by A. Dunkel, the GATT Director General, was 
substantial again (Paemen, Bensch, 1995). Extensive facilitation and brokerage prevented the 
failure of the round after the breakdown of ministerial conferences in Montreal in December 
1988 and in Brussels in December 1990. Dunkel was also engaged in entrepreneurial 
recombination (a rather rare case in the GATT rounds), preparing a draft text of the final 
agreement that was used as a working document in 1992-1994. 
The entrepreneurship by top national figures was typically up to the task. For instance, US 
presidents played pivotal roles in the GATT Rounds. The deadlock in the Kennedy Round in 
May 1967 was resolved through intervention by L. Johnson, who pushed US trade negotiator 
(W. M. Roth) to accept some of the EC demands (Lee, 1999: 112) and also imposed 
deadlines on US trade negotiators (Coppolaro, 2013: 192). The leadership by J. Carter was 
instrumental in the Tokyo Round as well: the talks were re-invigorated in 1977, when US 
President reassured EC party that agricultural issues would be treated by the USA separately 
from other negotiation elements (Winham, 1986: 165-6). The costs of completing negotiation 
were thereby reduced and the round was completed in 1979: this, however, came at the 
expense of not achieving regulatory deal in agricultural trade (the task carried over to 
Uruguay Round). 
The entrepreneurship by lower-level bureaucrats varied too. In the Kennedy Round, J. Rey, 
EC negotiator, was effective in Kirznerian entrepreneurship, maintaining a dialogue with EC 
members and stakeholders, explaining the benefits and potential threats if the round is not 
completed (Coppolaro, 191). At times, he was exercising leadership, as was the case when 
Ray offered concessions to the US on tobacco and canned fruit without consultation with EC 
member states and EC Council of Ministers (Coppolaro, 188). 
We note failures of entrepreneurial recombination. As documented by Tallberg (2006: 192), 
the efforts to create a draft document may have opposite effects, accentuating the differences 
in positions, when the trade conflict is acute (as was the case of the chair of WTO General 
Council, Ali Tchumo during WTO Doha Round). 
The failure of several types of entrepreneurship also occurred in the GATT history. The ITO 
initiative and its subsequent failure is a prominent example of too ambitious undertaking 
supported by too little entrepreneurship. Intended as a regulatory organ with a task to 
preclude destabilizing forces of protectionism that reigned in the 1930s (and exacerbated the 
Great Depression and arguably paved the road to world war), ITO idea was not aligned with 
dominant frames and political and economic context of the time (as shown above). 
Importantly it was not supported by policy entrepreneurship. 
Firstly, the inability of US President H. Truman to make ITO proposal palatable to the US 
Congress and resultant rejection of the ITO draft Charter led to rejection of the Charter by 
other parties (Milner, 1997: 139). The limited leadership at international talks was manifested 
by the absence of a strong ideational entrepreneur who could support free trade idea, 
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exposing its benefits and building relevant coalitions. This was in contrast to other post-war 
regulatory bodies (e.g. the pivotal role of H. Morgenthau in the Bretton-Woods Conferences). 
Secondly, in terms of entrepreneurial recombination, the US negotiators submitted templates 
and organisational blueprints for ITO that were too stringent in legal and organisational sense 
and hence deemed not acceptable by other parties. The blunt and ambitious liberalization 
proposal by the US did not accommodate the specific realities of European and developing 
economies: country-specific and protracted paths of post-war reconstruction; the unsettled 
direction and nature of trade flows post-war; a complex mix of emerging regulatory 
instruments (direct state administration, maintenance of private cartels, exchange controls). 
Overall, for a world economic system in disarray a more flexible trade regulation was needed 
(Heilperin, 1950; Dam, 1970: 15-16). 
Thirdly, Kirznerian facilitation or influence through synergistic strategies was limited too: 
despite enormous political and economic power in the 1940s, the US negotiators eagerly 
conceded to alternative proposals (e.g. import quota and balance of payments clauses by the 
UK, import restrictions to promote economic development by Inia and Cuba, among others), 
thereby eroding the initial liberal ITO draft by the US,  cluttering it with contradictions  
and dispensations and making virtually unratifiable (Heilperin, 1948: 4). 
5. Conclusion 
This paper considered several issues pertaining to the provision of international public goods 
(IPGs).  
Firstly, a specific type of IPGs was defined and characterized, the “governance IPG” 
(alternatively defined as a global policy outcome or international governance regime). It was 
shown that this IPG type possesses unique characteristics that make it different from other 
IPGs, particularly when IPG production is concerned. 
Secondly, international cooperation needed to obtain “governance IPG” was conceptualized 
broadly as a set of multiple adjustments and changes at domestic and international level, 
across several activity streams and at both agenda setting and negotiation stages.  
Thirdly, the problem of equilibrium and disequilibria in international governance was 
examined. International policy entrepreneurship was defined as a set of activities targeted to 
eliminate or moderate governance disequilibria (with respect to both policy institutions and 
policy instruments and mechanisms). The concept was elaborated based on the contributions 
of I. M. Kirzner and J. A. Schumpeter in economics. Three principal entrepreneurial roles 
were outlined – leadership, facilitation (coordination) and recombination. These roles are 
complementary, ensuring that disequilibria are reduced using multiple means and from 
several directions. Policy entrepreneurship was viewed as ubiquitous and idiosyncratic 
activity, with multiple agents performing entrepreneurial functions. A tentative classification 
of policy entrepreneurs and roles in the field of international trade governance was proposed.  
Fourthly, policy entrepreneurship during the agenda setting and negotiation was considered. 
For this purpose, the existing models (“multiple streams model” of J. Kingdon and 
“negotiation as management process” by G. Winham) were extended. We identified five 
agenda setting streams, each involving the exercise of entrepreneurship. Regarding the 
relationship between streams, we argue that their role in agenda setting is differentiated. 
Without the problem framing and experimentation/learning streams no agenda setting will be 
possible (if problems are not defined and if actors are not attempting to change existing 
policies in some way, no new agendas will be set and the policy will persist). Hence, 
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entrepreneurship in these two streams is a necessary condition for initiating regime dynamics. 
However, it is not sufficient, as without active advocacy and facilitation of agenda processes, 
creation of adequate analytical instruments and recognition of the timing issues and broader 
context, the agenda setting may turn excessively lengthy, amorphous and inconclusive. Thus, 
we argue that while activities in problem framing and experimentation/learning streams 
determine the mere feasibility of policy regime change, the other three streams condition its  
practical likelihood. Entrepreneurship at the negotiation stage was seen to condition the 
actual form of the “governance IPG”. Entrepreneurial leadership and facilitation were 
instrumental in timely completion of the talks and in the reduction of negotiation costs. 
Entrepreneurial recombination was crucial in delivering the quality IPG.  
Finally, some preliminary analysis was conducted, demonstrating the exercise of policy 
entrepreneurship (or its absence) in several instances of the GATT/WTO trade policy 
making. It was shown that timely provision of a quality “governance IPG” (liberal trade 
policy regime) hinges on the continuous exercise of all three types of policy entrepreneurship.  
Overall, international policy entrepreneurship is neither limited to simple awaiting of 
opportunities with ready solutions at hand, nor is it exercised discretely, nor is it restricted to 
a single actor. Instead we argue that entrepreneurship would be exercised cont inuously: at 
any point of time and in every stream, entrepreneurial activity would be exercised by several 
actors. 
Methodologically, the paper introduces an outline for interdisciplinary research in 
international governance by merging several literature streams from the fields of political 
economy, public policy and international relations. The analytical framework introduced in 
the paper also considers the complexity of international policymaking. The specific 
contribution of the paper has been the focus on agency in international policy making,  
making it a central component of policy change, in contrast to approaches that focus on 
factors that are incidental or of secondary importance to policy analysis or do not truly 
explain it. The concept of entrepreneurship would allow a more detailed and structured 
analysis of the dynamics and agency in international governance. 
The concept of international policy entrepreneurship (and policy entrepreneurship in general)  
can be elaborated in several directions. Firstly, further clarification of entrepreneurial roles 
and the classification of entrepreneurs may be needed, given that Kirznerian and 
Schumpeterian views of entrepreneurship are rather idiosyncratic. Secondly, the position of 
entrepreneurs in political and policy networks can potentially affect entrepreneurs‟ political 
capital and power, and respectively the effectiveness of entrepreneurship (Christopoulos 
2006). The proposed framework will thus need to incorporate the analysis of networks.  
Thirdly, it is necessary to consider how behavioural variables constrain or enable 
entrepreneurship, specifically the integrative versus distributive orientation, risk attitudes, 
perceptions of the gains and losses. The contributions from the behavioural theory of 
negotiations, as well as prospect theory (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979) can be instrumental in 
this regard. Fourthly, an in-depth analysis of the personal characteristics and attributes of 
entrepreneurs (rhetorical ability, foresight, persistence, alertness, negotiating skills) may be 
justified, if an actor-centered perspective on policy-making is adopted, and if explanation is 
needed as to why certain entrepreneurs are more effective than others. In addition, more 
fundamental question will need to be answered: are entrepreneurial functions and actions 
complementary (as postulated in this paper), or there is clash and competition between them; 
in what situations (negotiation type) particular entrepreneurial function is more salient, e.g. 
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incremental recombinant entrepreneurship versus entrepreneurial leadership; what underlying 
motivation of entrepreneurs dominates (self-interest or genuine desire to improve policies). 
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1
 This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first attempt to apply policy entrepreneurship concept to the 
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analysis of international governance. The study by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) considers international diffusion 
of policy ideas by policy entrepreneur, but does not examine the issue of the formation of governance regime.    
2
 The terms “provision” and “production” of IPGs are used interchangeably, albeit the former term is preferable, 
given multiple logics and processes, not limited to economic one. 
